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Case Report
Planting a misdiagnosis of Alzheimer’s
disease in a person’s mind
Merckelbach H, Jelicic M, Jonker C. Planting a misdiagnosis of
Alzheimer’s disease in a person’s mind.
Objective: There is an extensive corpus of knowledge about how
misinformation may distort autobiographical memories. A diagnostic error
can be conceptualised as a form of misinformation.
Methods: The authors discuss the case of a 58-year-old woman who was
given a misdiagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease.
Results: The patient was deeply convinced that the diagnosis was correct,
even when she was confronted with contradictory evidence.
Conclusion: A diagnosis is not a neutral piece of information. It
profoundly affects the lives of patients. The consequences of a
misdiagnosis may be similar to persistent false memories.
Harald Merckelbach1, Marko
Jelicic1, Cees Jonker2
1Faculty of Psychology and Neurosciences,
Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands;
and 2Department of Psychiatry/Alzheimer Centre,
VU University Medical Center, Amsterdam, The
Netherlands
Keywords: Alzheimer’s disease; cognition;
memory; stress
Dr Harald Merckelbach, Faculty of Psychology and
Neuroscience, Maastricht University, PO Box 616,
6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands.
Tel: 043 3881945;
Fax: 043-3884196;
E-mail: H.Merckelbach@maastrichtuniversity.nl
Accepted for publication May 23, 2011
Numerous studies have documented that misinforma-
tion may contaminate people’s memory. In the clas-
sic experiments of Beth Loftus, research participants
watched a video of, for example, a red car going past
a stop sign and were then asked misleading questions
like ‘did another car pass the red car when it stopped
at the yield sign?’ When participants later tried to
remember the details of the video, a majority of them
would insist that they saw a yield sign. Misinforma-
tion does not only distort crucial memory details it
may also create what has been termed ‘rich false
memories’. Thus, confronting individuals repeatedly
with false information about a fictitious event (e.g.
being lost in a shopping mall as a child) leads many
of them to develop detailed recollections of this
event (1). These false memories tend to be robust.
That is, many participants will stick to their false
memory even when they are confronted with contra-
dictory evidence. This is illustrated by patients who
develop false memories of fictitious childhood trau-
mas as a result of suggestive psychotherapy. Some
authors have noted that retracting such memories
takes longer than developing them (2).
Misinformation may also affect how patients per-
ceive symptoms. Like memories, symptoms are
often ambiguous. This ambiguity makes symptom
perception susceptible to misinformation. A case
in point is breathlessness in asthma patients and
its imperfect correlation with airway obstruction.
When asthma patients are given false feedback about
respiratory sounds, many of them will manifest
breathlessness irrespective of pulmonary function-
ing (3). Non-organic memory complaints of elderly
patients are also ambiguous symptoms (4). Clini-
cians’ attempts to interpret such symptoms in the
absence of a thorough neuropsychological assess-
ment of the patient are fraught with risks. A recent
German study, for example, found that neuropsycho-
logical follow-up assessments confirmed a clinical
suspicion of Alzheimer dementia in only 38% of 47
consecutive referrals (5). The authors of this study
rightly pointed out that a false-positive diagnosis of
Alzheimer dementia may have far reaching conse-
quences as the diagnosis per se may set into motion
all kinds of negative reactions. Here, we describe the
case of a woman who was provided with misinfor-
mation about her memory difficulties and came to
believe that she suffered from Alzheimer’s disease.
In early 2000, a 58-year-old woman consulted
a neurologist in a general hospital because of her
memory difficulties. She was a shop owner and had
recently noticed that for the first time in her life,
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she needed a calendar to help her remember her
appointments. Ten years earlier, her mother had been
diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease and the patient
was afraid that she began to develop the first signs of
this condition. Except for rheumatic complaints and
lumbago, her medical history was unremarkable. The
neurologist’s investigation included a brain single
photon emission computed tomography (SPECT),
which was reported to show frontal hypoperfusion.
The neurologist interpreted this as an indication of
mild-to-moderate Alzheimer’s disease. In the patient
files, he estimated her mini-mental state examination
(MMSE) score to be 22, although he never carried
out a formal MMSE (6). The neurologist prescribed
the patient 2 × 6 mg/day rivastigmine. In the months
that followed, the patient was permanently in a state
of confusion and felt devastated by the diagnosis,
up to the point that she considered suicide. The
neurologist included her in a research trial and in
that context blood samples were taken from her.
According to the patient, being a research subject
made the diagnosis and the medical routines (e.g.
blood sampling) even more outstanding.
It happened that her husband was diagnosed
with prostrate cancer. Because the patient worried
that medication side-effects might interfere with her
abilities to care for her husband, she contacted a
telephone helpline of an Alzheimer resource centre.
The expert of the centre advised her to seek a
second opinion. In the summer of 2000, she then
consulted the neurologist of a university clinic
(C. J.). He conducted a full anamnesis as well as a
neurological examination. He also ordered a second
brain SPECT and a standardised neuropsychological
assessment battery that involved testing of memory,
perception, attention, language, executive functions,
as well as the MMSE and the cognitive screening test
(CST) (7). All were unremarkable and her MMSE
and CST scores were in the normal (i.e. non-
pathological) range. The neurologist concluded that
the frontal hypoperfusion that had been found on
the first SPECT probably was an aspecific reflection
of a mild depression. Indeed, when the patient first
began to worry about her forgetfulness, she went
through a stressful period. She had a conflict with a
close family member, her commercial activities were
hectic and she was tired.
The university hospital neurologist went to great
lengths to explain this pattern to her. Nevertheless, it
proved to be difficult to convince the patient that she
did not suffer from Alzheimer’s disease. It was only
after two lengthy sessions in which the test results
were shown and explained in detail to her that the
patient began to doubt that she suffered from the
condition. Even long after these sessions, she had
episodes during which she was deeply concerned that
she had Alzheimer’s disease although it was obvious
that she was functioning normally.
We (H. M. and M. J.) recently interviewed the
patient. She related that she often had intrusive
thoughts about the misdiagnosis. She also had
a tendency to catastrophise about minor memory
lapses. Furthermore, she had developed an intense
suspicion and fear of hospitals, medical interventions
and especially blood sampling. She exhibited the
signs of a blood-injury-illness phobia. In 2009
and 2010, two official investigative committees
documented that the neurologist of the general
hospital had misdiagnosed a number of patients
with Alzheimer’s disease. The neurologist was
forced to resign and all in all 26 malpractice suits
were filed against him and the general hospital.
The patient described here was not involved in
litigation. In her case, revoking the misdiagnosis
of Alzheimer’s disease took place years before
the patient became aware of the fact that other
patients had filed malpractice suits against the general
hospital neurologist.
Discussion
Earlier reports showed that a number of factors
may contribute to the misdiagnosis of Alzheimer’s
disease, including overreliance on brain imaging
techniques, failure to rule out depressive symptoms
as a confounder and absence of neuropsychological
assessment (8). Obviously, these factors also played
a role in the misdiagnosis described here.
Meanwhile, earlier reports have been less con-
cerned with why patients accept a misdiagnosis of
Alzheimer’s disease in the first place. Our case sug-
gests that there are some interesting parallels with
false memory phenomena. First, the extant litera-
ture on false memories shows that misinformation
is most potent when it is provided by trusted per-
sons. In the case described here, the neurologist
presented himself to the patient as a friend of the
Dutch royal family and in this way impressed her.
Second, misinformation impacts memory most when
it is repeated and when it is connected to accu-
rate details. In one of her studies, Loftus inter-
viewed adults about childhood events. Participants
were interviewed two times about the events: some
events actually happened and had been supplied
by family members, but one event – being lost in
a shopping mall – was false. In follow-up inter-
views, many participants recalled the false event in
great detail (1). Likewise, in the current case, the
patient was repeatedly told by the neurologist that
she suffered from Alzheimer’s disease. Because this
information was embedded in discussions about her
mother (who had been diagnosed with the disease),
61
Merckelbach et al.
the SPECT results and a research trial on Alzheimer’s
disease, the patient became fully convinced that the
diagnosis must be correct. Third, in Loftus’ study,
some research participants insisted that the false
event had happened to them even after debrief-
ing (1,2). Similarly, the disease conviction of the
patient described above proved to be difficult to
correct. Fourth, research shows that misinformation
only contaminates memory when the misinforma-
tion is plausible to begin with. In the case described
here, the patient did have memory complaints and
there was a positive family history for Alzheimer’s
disease. The ambiguity of her memory complaints
created the opportunity for misinformation to be
effective (3,4,9).
Admittedly, our case provides only an anecdo-
tal illustration of the similarities between the effects
of misdiagnosis and false memories. Clearly, these
similarities deserve systematic study and this is par-
ticularly true for the misdiagnosis of Alzheimer’s
disease: there are reasons to suspect that such
misdiagnosis are more common than one would
expect (5,8). Conferring a diagnostic label is far
from a neutral act (10). Many diagnostic labels have
strong stereotypical connotations and sometimes,
these will automatically shape the experiences and
behaviour of patients, a phenomenon called ‘diag-
noses threat’ (11). Studies on how misinformation
can create diagnosis threat may help us understand
the huge impact that wrong diagnosis may have (9).
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